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We show that the improved effort of employees associated with incentive contracts depends 
on the properties of the performance measures used in the contract.  We also find that the 
power of incentives in the contract is only indirectly related to any improved employee effort. 
High  powered  incentive  increase  the  selection  effect  of the  incentive  contract  and  attract 
better employees to the firm.  The selection effect of the incentive contract depends, in turn, 
on the (perceived) properties of the performance measures specified in the contract.  These 
results hold after controlling for an array of incentive contract design characteristics and for 
differences in organizational context.  Data is from a third party survey on compensation 
practices among Chief Executive Officers.  Our estimation procedures address several known 
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Effort and Selection Effects of Incentive Contracts 
 
1. Introduction 
  Incentive contracts have both a selection effect and an effort effect (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992).  These contracts motivate employees to work according to the desires of the 
owners of the firm through linking their compensation to measured performance (the effort 
effect).    If  structured  in  a  way  that  is  attractive  to  individuals  with  certain  traits,  but 
unattractive  to  employees  without  these  traits,  incentive  contracts  can  be  used  to  select 
appropriate people to the job (the selection effect).  These properties of incentive contracts are 
well-described in traditional economic models.  The same models also clarify the key role of 
the incentive power offered in the contract with regard to both selection and effort effects 
(Gibbons,  1998).    Incentive  power  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  contingent  to  fixed  pay.  
Relatively little attention, however, has been paid to the properties of performance measures 
used in incentive contracts.  Specifically, few studies address the question how the properties 
of performance measures impact on the selection and effort effects of incentive contracts and 
whether the impact of performance measures properties depends on the incentive power in the 
contract.  Earlier studies have addressed the influence of controllability filters on the selection 
and effort effects of incentive contracts (Waller and Chow, 1985; Shields and Waller, 1988) 
in an experimental setting.  A growing literature has documented how performance measure 
properties influence their (relative) weight in incentive contracts (Ittner and Larcker, 2001).  
What remains unaddressed is how the selection and effort effects depend on performance 
measure  properties  and  whether  this  relation  in  turn  depends  on  the  power  of  incentives 
provided in the contract.  Our study uses data from a third party survey on compensation 
practices  among  151  Chief  Executive  Officers  to  answer  these  questions.    All  surveyed 
companies  have  incentive  contracts  in  place,  but  vary  in  terms  of  contract  design  and 
organizational context.     3
  Our results confirm earlier findings that the effort and selection effects of incentive 
contracts  are  interdependent.    We  show  that  more  high-powered  incentives  attract  better 
employees, who, in turn, provide more effort.  We also show that high-powered incentives do 
not affect effort directly; it is only through their impact on selection that effort increases.   
However, we do find strong evidence that performance measures with desirable properties 
increase the effort provided under incentive contracts and positively affect the selection via 
incentive contracts.  The impact of performance measure properties does not appear to be 
moderated by the incentive power provided in the contract.  Together these findings speak 
strongly about the importance of the role performance measures have in incentive contracts.  
Our findings are robust when controlling for an array of variables that proxy for differences in 
incentive contract specifics and organizational context.   
  We estimate our model using partial least squares. Partial least squares estimation 
allows us to jointly assess the structural and measurement attributes of the model, while it 
avoids stringent assumptions about the (normal) distribution of variables that are usual in 
other latent variables estimation procedures.  As such, it is very suitable for relatively small 
samples.  What’s more, in cases where explicitly accounting for potentially deleterious effects 
of the errors-in-variables problem is called for, partial least squares allows a more accurate 
assessment of the relations among variables than simple OLS.  Survey data, especially when 
it  is  collected  by  a  third  (i.e.,  non-academic)  party,  is  often  criticized  for  containing 
measurement error (although it is not clear that the error in this type of data is any greater 
than in other --publicly available-- data).  We acknowledge this problem and deal with it 
through our estimation procedure.  
  This paper proceeds as follows.  The next sections reviews the literature on incentive 
contracts in relation with performance measurement properties and incentive power.  We then 
describe our sample, variable measurement and econometric procedures used to estimate the 
model. Next, we report the results of the study and provide a discussion of our findings.  We 
conclude with some final remarks and suggestions for future work.   
2. Development of empirical predictions   4
While the accounting literature has recognized early on that the selection and effort 
effects of incentive contracts are affected by the properties of the measure of performance 
specified in the contract (Waller and Chow, 1985, Chow, 1983), relatively little attention has 
to date been paid to exploring the exact nature of the relation between performance measure 
properties and incentive contract effects.  Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) argue that the effort 
effects  of  incentive  contracts  are  a  function  of  (1)  personality  traits  of  the  agent,  (2) 
characteristics of the agent’s task, (3) the context of employment (organizational structure, 
features of the accounting system), and (4) design choices within the incentive system.  We 
focus on two key issues within these determinants of the effort effect of incentives: (1) the 
influence of performance measure properties and (2) the influence of incentive power (i.e., 
the extent of variable pay vs. fixed pay).  Our sample selection allows us to abstract from the 
influence of task characteristics. We also mitigate the influence of personality traits on the 
effort effect of incentives by controlling for the selection effects of incentives (Waller and 
Chow, 1985; Banker et al., 2000).  We discuss these methodological issues further below.  
First, we derive how performance measure properties and incentive power are expected to 
affect the effort effects of incentives.   
Incentive power 
  Agency models suggest that incentives are needed to elicit ‘effort’ from agents to 
perform  tasks  that  are  valuable  to  the  principal,  but  onerous  to  the  agent  (Milgrom  and 
Roberts, 1992).  Stronger incentives are provided if the ratio between variable pay and fixed 
pay is greater.  Considerable evidence exists that shows that incentives matter in the sense 
suggested by the agency literature (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Prendergast, 1999).  Larcker 
(1983), Brickley et al. (1985), Tehranian and Waegelein (1985) and Yermack (1997) report 
positive abnormal stock returns on the announcement of the adoption of an incentive plan.  
Firms that have adopted incentive plans seem to perform better compared to those that have 
not (Leonard, 1990; Wallace, 1997).  Employees perform better when subjected to incentive 
schemes where pay is more closely related to performance (Abowd, 1990; Banker  et al., 
1996;  Banker  et  al.,  2000;  Kahn  and  Sherer,  1990;  Lazear,  1986;  Simons,  1987;   5
Govindarajan, 1988).  For example, Banker et al. (2000) show that a substantial part of the 
total  increase  in  productivity  of  a  firm  after  the  adoption  of  an  incentive  plan  is  due  to 
improved effort by existing and new employees (although most of the productivity effect 
seems related to the selection of better quality employees).  The empirical evidence is not 
limited to private sector firms only.  For example, Baber et al. (2002) show that incentive pay 
plans can be used to motivate managers of charities to increase the efficiency of their fund 
raising activities.  In sum, the effort effect of incentive contracts depends on the incentive 
power specified in the contract. Stronger incentives will elicit more effort, ceteris paribus. 
This suggests the following hypothesis in alternative form: 
  Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relation between incentive power  and the 
effort effect of incentives.    
Performance measure properties 
Many authors have pointed out that the design of incentive systems is “intimately 
linked” (Milkovich and Newman, 2002) with the properties of performance measures (Bloom 
and Milkovich, 1998; Tsui et al., 1997; Waller and Chow, 1985; Bushman and Smith, 2001).  
As to what constitutes the ideal nature of these properties, the literature has not achieved 
consensus yet.  Some authors stress that performance measures needs to be fair and equitable 
(Bretz  et  al.,  1992;  Foster  and  Ward,  1994).  Others  point  at  objectivity  and  accuracy  as 
desirable properties (Waller and Chow, 1985; Prendergast, 2002; Gibbs et al., 2003), while 
some  hold  that  measures  should  be  stable  or  reliable  (Milkovich  and  Newman,  2002; 
Campbell, 1990; Heneman, 1986).  Not all these descriptions of ideal properties have been 
rigorously derived and it is sometimes difficult to assess whether they are based on normative 
contentions or on findings from empirical or theoretical research.  Traditional agency models 
outline  the  consequences  of  imprecise,  noisy,  performance  measures.  In  particular,  such 
measures may impose undue risk on agents and reduce the efficacy of incentives (Holmstrom, 
1979; Banker and Datar, 1989; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Gibbons, 1998; Indjejikian, 1999).  
What’s more, several recent papers have drawn attention to the possibility that performance 
measures may be subject to distortion, i.e., are not congruent with desirable corporate goals   6
(Baker,  2000,  2002;  Bushman  et  al.,  2000)  or do  not  communicate  strategy  well enough 
(Malina and Selto, 2002).  We infer that noise and distortion are disadvantageous properties 
of performance measures and harm the applicability of the measure in incentive contracts.  
While noise and distortion are  separate properties, they have the same  effect  on measure 
applicability. 
A noisy measure contains observation errors with regard to the true action choice of 
an  agent.  Providing  incentives  under  these  circumstances  is  costly  (Ittner  et  al.,  1997; 
Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993; Keating, 1997; Bushman et al, 1995; Nagar, 2002).  
Since the agent cannot rely on the principal to be rewarded for delivered effort (since the 
performance  measure  may  incorrectly  reflect  his  effort  choice),  he  bears  additional  risk.  
Assuming agents are risk-averse implies that the principal will have to compensate the agent 
for this additional risk (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; Shields and 
Waller,  1988).    Although  empirical  studies  on  the  relation  between  noisy  performance 
measures and effort effects have been scarce, and at times yield mixed results (Garen, 1994; 
Aggerwal  and  Samwick,  1999),  the  evidence  seems  to  indicate  that  wealth  gains  are 
associated with reduction of noise in measures (Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Luft and Shields, 
2002).   
A performance measure is distorted if it incentivizes agents to act in a manner that is 
not consistent with corporate goals (Baker, 1992, 2000, 2002).  Using a distorted measure in 
an incentive contract aggravates the problem, since agents will be motivated to work harder to 
achieve some undesirable goal.  Empirical studies have shown that non-distorted measures 
can increase incentives to manage investments in the interest of shareholders (Wallace, 1997), 
align  managerial  actions  and  corporate  strategy    (McKenzie  and  Schilling,  1998),  and 
improve communication of strategy (Malina and Selto, 2002).  Note that some authors have 
argued that noise or distortion in performance measures should be mended by including more 
measures in the evaluation (e.g., Abowd and Kaplan, 1999).  When we refer to the properties 
of performance measures in a multiple measure context, we mean the ‘grand’ properties of the   7
complete set of performance measures used in an incentive contract.  In other words, we refer 
to noise and distortion in all performance measures together.   
Ittner  and  Larcker  (2002)  show  that  the  relative  (distortion  and  noise)  score  of 
performance measures will determine their weight in incentive contracts when more than one 
measure is included, as suggested by the informativeness principle.  Although agency theory 
suggests that the inclusion of every informative measure in an incentive contract is beneficial, 
it is unclear whether such is possible at low costs.  Murphy (1999) argues that the role of 
‘informativeness’ diminishes when the set of potential actions a manager can take to affect 
corporate value is expanded.  The idea is that managers typically can choose between a wide 
array of actions that will affect shareholder wealth.  The agency problem, then, is not as much 
to make sure that managers exert effort, but to motivate managers to choose optimally among 
a multitude of actions.  Indeed, the use of multiple measures may reduce the employee’s 
understanding of the overall corporate goals and cause confusion (Ittner and Larcker, 1998).  
What’s  more  when  many  measures  are  used  to  evaluate  performance,  top  management’s 
judgment is needed to aggregate information to one, overall, conclusion.  This increases the 
opportunities for subordinates to engage in lobbying behavior or other unproductive effort, 
which is likely to be detrimental to performance (Prendergast and Topel, 1994; Milgrom, 
1988; Murphy and Oyer, 2003).   Although empirical research on the effect of using multiple 
performance measures is scarce to date, it would seem that little, if any, evidence exists that 
firms benefit from doing so (Ittner et al., 2003).   
In sum, we hypothesize the following relation between properties of performance 
measures and the effort effect of incentives (in alternative form). 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a negative relation between the amount of noise and/or 
distortion in performance measures and the effort effect of incentives. 
Interaction effect between incentive power and performance measure properties 
  Milgrom  and  Roberts  (1992)  and  Demski  (1994)  argue  that  strong  incentives  are 
likely to be optimal when good performance is easy to identify.  In other words, the effort 
effect of incentive power depends on the properties of the performance measure.  Prendergast   8
(1999) notes that most studies that document a relation between effort effect and incentive 
power are carried out in cases where the nature of the job of the employee is simple, in the 
sense that an aggregate measure of performance is readily available.  Tsui et al. (1997) report 
evidence that the absence of such aggregate measure may substantially restrict the effort gains 
from  using  high-powered  incentive  contracts.  Moreover,  the  effort  effect  associated  with 
desirable properties of performance measures depends on the incentive power in the contract.  
Both  performance  measure  properties  specified  above  are  relevant.  More  noisy  measures 
reduce the precision  with which performance is assessed  and  increase the  likelihood  that 
errors in this assessment are made.  Thus, agents face higher risk under noisy measures and 
using these becomes more costly.  Distorted performance measures are more undesirable in 
high-powered incentive contracts since they will elicit behavior from the agent that is not 
optimal to the firm (i.e., not congruent with corporate goals).  It is a well-known result in the 
theoretical  literature  that  when  such  distortions  are  present,  incentive  power  should  be 
reduced (up to the extent that only a flat wage is offered) (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, 
1994).  
Hypothesis 3A: The relation between effort effect and incentive power is conditional 
upon the properties of the performance measures used.  
Hypothesis  3B:  The  relation  between  effort  effect  and  the  properties  of  the 
performance measures used is conditional upon the power of the incentives provided. 
Controlling for personality traits of the agent 
Incentive schemes do not just increase the effort supplied by agents, they also attract 
more productive agents to the firm (Baker et al., 1988) and thus change the compensation of 
its labor force.  Gibbs (1995) and Lazear (1986) show that higher-powered incentives attract 
higher  quality  employees,  since  more  able  employees  will  benefit  more  from  incentive 
schemes than will the weaker.  In support of his argument, Gibbs (1995) documents that 
employees  who  have  received  bonuses  in  the  past  have  a  better  chance  of  promotion 
(suggesting these employees are high-quality). Bloom and Michel (2002) and Banker et al. 
(2000) show that employee turnover rates are higher in firms with incentive schemes, which   9
is consistent with a sorting effect of these schemes.  The selection effect of incentive contracts 
is not only increasing in the power of incentives (Prendergast, 1999), but also depends on the 
properties of performance measures (Waller and Chow, 1985; Shields and Waller, 1988).  
Waller and Chow (1985) point out that once this selection effect is controlled for, the effort 
effect of incentive schemes is no longer impacted by differences in self-perceived personality 
traits of the agents.  Indeed, the agent’s perception of his own type and of the features of the 
employment contract determine whether he will decide to accept the employment offer.  In 
equilibrium, agents who  self-selected into the contract should be those whose personality 
traits are consistent with the hiring firm’s requirements.  We investigate our hypotheses after 
controlling for the selection effect of incentive schemes to ensure that our results only reflect 
the influence of incentive power and performance measure properties on the effort effect of 
incentives.  
Controlling for the context of employment and incentive system design 
  Context  of  employment.    We  include  industry  membership  to  characterize  the 
organizational structure of firms.  We expect the effect of incentive contracts to be different 
for manufacturing firms and firms that are either in some service industry, or are not-for-
profit or government agencies (Ittner and Larcker, 2002).  Prior research has shown that the 
post-adoption success of a new management tool depends on the support its adoption receives 
from  (middle)  management  and  from  employees  at  large  (see,  e.g.  Shields,  1995).      We 
therefore include (1) management support and (2) employee support as control variables. 
  Incentive system design. Firms that have more experience in using incentive contracts 
might be more successful (if only because we expect firms experiencing long term problems 
with these contacts to dissolve them).  On the other hand, there is some reason to believe that 
the performance effect of incentive contracts may taper off over time (Banker et al., 2000).  
We control for the time a firm has been using incentive contracts without making specific 
predictions as to it association with the effort effect. The extent to which employees in a firm 
are covered under an incentive contract is likely to affect its performance (Ittner and Larcker, 
2002).  The incentive contract’s screening function will be extended to a greater number of   10
jobs if the plan covers more employees.  Likewise, more employees will be motivated to 
choose their actions in a manner consistent with the interests of the owners if coverage of the 
incentive contract is extended.  Plan coverage is therefore included in our analysis. 
3. Sample, measures and model specification 
  This section first describes the data collection procedure and details about the final 
sample.  It then defines the variables and their measurement.  The translation of theoretical 
constructs  to  measurable  variables  is  often  not  easy  in  organizational  studies  (Ittner  and 
Larcker, 2001; Luft and Shields, 2003).  We therefore devote attention to several procedures 
used to investigate the reliability and validity of our empirical measures.  In particular, we use 
a latent variable model to deal with measurement error and provide evidence on construct 
validity as recommended by Ittner and Larcker (2001).   
3.1 Sample and descriptive statistics 
  We  use  a  proprietary  dataset  based  on  KPMG  Consulting/People  Solutions  2001 
survey  of  incentive  pay  plans  in  Dutch firms.    The  survey  provides  information  on  plan 
design (incentive power, employee coverage, experience with incentive plans), pre-adoption 
objectives of the plan and post-adoption achievement of these objectives and organizational 
context information (size, industry, management and employee support of the plan).  KPMG 
distributed the survey to approximately 2200 organizations with more than 100 employees.  
Addresses were obtained from an outside vendor of corporate data; the survey was therefore 
not sent to KPMG clients per se.  The survey was addressed to the firm’s CEO and/or chief 
human resource officer.
1  234 firms returned the survey, of these 151 firms had implemented 
an incentive pay plan at the time of the survey.  The remaining 83 firms (that had not adopted 
an incentive pay plan) were asked only about their size and industry.  Analysis shows that 
                                                      
1  Since  the  respondents  all  were  CEO,  we  control,  at  least  to  some  extent,  for  the  influence  of 
characteristics of the agent’s task.  Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) feel that ‘task complexity’ is the most 
common researched variable in this category.  It would seem that CEOs share similar, complex tasks.   11
both groups are of similar size, but that relatively more non-adopters were not-for-profit firms 
or government agencies.
2   
  Ittner and Larcker (2001) enumerate some of the difficulties associated with the use 
of survey data collected by third parties.  The most severe of these include (1) the difficulty in 
assessing sample selection biases and (2) poor construct properties.  Our data suffers from 
these problems as well.  We are limited in terms of addressing sample selection biases or 
combining  survey  data  with  data  from  public  resources  since  the  surveys  were  returned 
anonymously.  Although the questionnaire included questions about organizational practices 
that  likely  influence  incentive  contracts  and  usually  had  more  than  one  indicator  per 
construct,  the  questions  asked  were  sometimes  ‘double-barreled’.    Moreover,  the 
questionnaire used a 4-point Likert scale, instead of the more usual 5 or 7-point scales.   Also, 
only one respondent answered all questions, which probably increases the likelihood of some 
measurement error in our variables.  While we fully acknowledge these limitations of our 
dataset, we also take care to explicitly address measurement error in our estimation procedure. 
We  discuss  this  more  fully  below.    Although  we  agree  with  Zimmerman’s  (2001,  420) 
statement  that  ‘better  data  is  always  preferred  to  poorer  data’,  we  also  feel  that 
notwithstanding the limitations of our data, they shed some new light on relations that are not 
yet fully understood.  The alternative would be to discard the data completely.  We feel that a 
more fruitful approach is to leave it to the reader to decide how the evidence presented here 
should be weighted against his prior beliefs.   
                                                      
2 Mean and median size of non-adopters was not significantly different from adopting firms.  However, 
48% of the non-adopters were not-for-profit firms or government agencies, whereas only 17% of the 
adopters were in this industry.  This difference is significant at the 1%-level using both a t-test for 
means and a non-parametric Wilcoxon test.  We used this information to conduct additional empirical 
analyses to evaluate the severity of potential selection biases.  Selection biases may arise because we 
observe  the  performance  effect  of  incentive  contracts  only  when  firms  report  to  have  adopted  an 
incentive pay plan.  Firms will adopt such plan when the net benefits of adoption are positive.  We 
observe only the outcome of the adoption decision (adopt, not adopt) and not this selection variable 
(net benefits of adoption).  Specifically, we used a Heckman (1979) regression to assess whether our 
sample  suffers  from  this  incidental  truncation  problem  (Greene  2000,  926).    Unreported  results 
(available upon request) suggest that our inferences are unaffected by neglecting the potential selection 
bias and that OLS provides consistent estimates of the parameters of interest.   12
  Appendix  1  provides  details  on  survey  questions  and  the  distribution  of  the 
respondents’ answers to these questions.  The sample consists of about one-third of firms 
from manufacturing, and also one-third of firms from wholesale, retail, transportation and 
other  services.    Approximately  17%  of  the  respondents  are  from  government  agencies 
(municipal and federal) or not for profit firms.  The remaining 19% of respondents is in a 
‘knowledge intensive’ service industry. Firm sizes vary between less than 100 to over 1000 
employees.  About 45% of the firms have fewer than 500 employees, and approximately 30% 
have  over  1000.    Most  firms  in  the  sub  sample  that  adopted  an  incentive  plan  have 
considerable experience (over three years) with these plans.  In almost half of these firms, 
more  than  50%  of  the  employees  are  covered  under  the  plan.    Although  the  maximum 
incentive pay that can be earned appears modest for most firms (65% receive at most 16% of 
their annual salary as incentive pay), a substantial amount (13.1%) of respondents reports that 
in their firm incentive pay is over 36% of annual salary.
3   
3.2 Measures 
In  this  section,  we  discuss  the  measurement  and  psychometric  properties  of  each 
construct.  We assess the composite reliability of each of the constructs with a composite 
reliability  index  proposed  by  Fornell  and  Larcker  (1981).  This  index  is  analogous  to 
Cronbach’s alpha and reflects the internal consistency of the indicators measuring a given 
construct.  For all of our constructs we find that composite reliability is good (above 0.80).  
We also computed estimates of the variance extracted (Fornell and Larcker, 1981).  This 
statistic measures the amount of variance that is captured by an underlying factor in relation 
to the amount of variance due to measurement error.  Estimates of 0.50 or larger are desirable.  
We find that the measurement error in our constructs is limited; in all cases the average 
variance extracted is above 0.50.  We also use this statistic to assess discriminant validity of 
our constructs.  For any two constructs, the square root of the variance extracted estimate 
should be greater than the simple correlation between these constructs.  Table 1 provides 
                                                      
3 In our sample incentive pay is based on individual performance (4.0%), team performance (56.5%), 
firm performance (22.6%) or otherwise (16.9%).   13
details  and  contains  the  simple  correlations  between  the  constructs.    The  highest  simple 
correlation is between the constructs ‘employee support’ and ‘top management support’ (corr. 
= 0.610).  This correlation is substantially lower than the smallest estimate of the square root 
of the variance extracted (0.727 for ‘effort effect’).  We conclude that discriminant validity is 
established in all cases.  Our estimation procedure requires all constructs to be standardized to 
zero mean variables with standard deviation of unity.   
Effort effects. Respondents were asked to indicate the effect of the incentive pay plan with 
regard to a number of dimensions (including stimulating entrepreneurial spirit, motivating 
effort in a desired fashion and contribution to a firm’s culture).  These dimensions are similar 
in  the  sense  that  all  are  related  to  motivating  effort  and  guiding  employee  action  choice 
towards  to  firm’s  goals.  We  labelled  the  underlying  construct  ‘effort  effects  of  incentive 
contracts’.  The survey questions used a four point fully anchored Likert scale (completely 
agree, agree, disagree, completely disagree).   
Incentive  power.    The  power  of  incentives  provided  through  the  incentive  pay  plan  was 
measured in terms of the additional monthly wages that could be earned at most each year 
under the plan.  Answer possibilities were (1) one monthly salary (8%), (2) two monthly 
salaries (16%), (3) three monthly salaries (24%), and (4) more than three monthly salaries.  
We transformed these categorical responses to a ratio scale, where answers of more than three 
monthly  salaries  were  transformed  to  the  incentive  power  value  of  50%  (and  the  other 
answers into the percentages mentioned in parentheses).
4   
Performance  measure  properties.    Respondents’  answers  to  three  questions  were  used  to 
assess the ‘grand’ properties of the performance measures used in the incentive contracts.  
These questions included the extent to which the performance of employees is measurable, 
the  congruence  between  the  performance  of  the  firm  and  the  measures  used  to  evaluate 
employees, the probability of exposing employees to arbitrary evaluations, and the extent to 
                                                      
4  The  results  are  robust  against  other  reasonable choices  with  regard  to  the  transformation  of  the 
category more than three monthly salaries (including: 75% and 100%).   14
which measures are limited to assessing short-term performance only, or only partly capture 
the responsibilities of employees. 
Interaction effect.  Our theory predicts that the influence of performance measure properties 
on the effort effect of incentive contracts depends on the level of incentive power.  Relations 
like these are commonly modelled in social sciences with an interaction term (Jaccard et al., 
1990).  We follow Ping‘s (1996) approach to estimate interaction effects in latent variable 
models.  The indicators of the interaction construct are created as products of the indicators of 
the two latent variables that are thought to interact.  In our case we compute three product 
terms by multiplying each indicator of our performance measures properties construct with 
the corresponding value from the incentive power construct.  This approach was validated for 
partial-least-squares models (our estimation method) by Chin et al. (2003).      
Control variables.  We include the following variables to control for various incentive plan 
design characteristics, personality traits, and organizational context differences: (1) selection 
effect, (2) support from top management, (3) support among non-management employees, (4) 
incentive  plan  coverage,  (5)  firm  size,  (6)  firm  experience  with  incentive  plans,  and  (7) 
industry.   
The selection effect was measured with three questions on the success of using the 
incentive plan in hiring and attracting good quality employees. Respondents rated success on 
a four-point fully anchored  Likert scale. The questions asked whether the firm is a more 
attractive employer on the market, whether the recruitment of employees was improved and, 
finally, whether the wage expense is better linked to the performance of the firm.  Two survey 
questions were related to the support top management provides to the use of incentive pay 
plans.  These questions sought to evaluate if management fully supported the implementation 
of the plan.  Three survey questions captured the support of non-management employees for 
the incentive plan.  The common denominator of these questions was whether the plan was 
contentious  among  employees.    Incentive  plan  coverage  was  measured  by  a  categorical 
survey question. Respondents were asked to indicate if (1) less than 5%, (2) 5-25%, (3) 25-
50% or (4) more than 50% of the employees were covered under the incentive plan.  These   15
answers were transformed to a ratio scale variable with values of 2.5%, 15%, 38%, or 75% 
respectively.
5  Firm size was measured with a categorical question using six possible answers: 
(1) less than 100 employees, (2) 100-250, (3) 250-500, (4) 500-750, (5) 750-1000, and (6) 
more than 1000.  We transformed these answers also to a ratio scale variable with values of 
50, 175, 375, 625, 875, and 1000 employees respectively.  We then took the natural logarithm 
to reduce scale problems.  A firm’s experience with incentive plans could be either (1) less 
than 1 year, (2) 1-2 years, (3) 2-3 years, or (4) longer than 3 years.  Instead of using ordinal 
variables, we transformed the answers to a ratio scale with values of 1, 1.5, 2.5 and 5 years, 
respectively.  Finally, we included an indicator variable which takes the value of unity if the 
firm is in a traditional manufacturing industry and zero otherwise.
6 
3.3 Model specification and econometric issues 
We estimate our latent variable model using partial least squares (PLS).  In PLS the 
measurement  model  (relating  the  latent  constructs  and  their  observed  indicators)  and  the 
structural  model  (which  specifies  the  relations  between  latent  constructs)  are  estimated 
together.    To  achieve  this,  the  measurement  and  structural  parameters  of  the  model  are 
estimated in an iterative fashion using simple and multiple ordinary least squares regressions 
(Barclay et al., 1995, p. 292).
7  PLS avoids assumptions that observations follow a specific 
distribution (e.g., multivariate normal) and that they are independently distributed.  As such, 
PLS  is  a  particularly  useful  estimation  method  for  smaller  samples  and  when  specific 
distributional  requirements  are  less  appropriate  (Chin  and  Newsted,  1999).    Because  the 
variables  are  standardized,  the  structural  equation  parameters  are  standardized  regression 
coefficients  and  the  measurement  model  parameters  are  correlations  between  the  latent 
variable and its observed indicators (not reported, but available from authors).  Bootstrapping 
is  used  to  evaluate  the  statistical  significance  of  the  path  coefficients.    Specifically,  we 
generate 1000 random samples of 151 observations (with replacement) and use the resulting 
                                                      
5 Results are, however, robust to reasonable other transformation schemes. 
6 We used this relatively crude industry control to save degrees of freedom in our model estimation. 
7 See Chin and Newsted (1999) or Wold (1982) for a detailed description of the estimation procedure.   16
empirical distribution of the parameter estimates to compute bootstrap t-statistics and standard 
errors.  Earlier applications in accounting include Ittner et al. (1997) and Anderson et al. 
(2002). 
Our model relates two effect variables (effort effect and selection effect) to our key 
explanatory  variables  (performance  measure  properties,  incentive  power,  and  their 
interaction).  We control as described earlier for an array of factors that are likely to impact 
on  the  effect  of  incentive  contracts.    It  should  be  noted  that  these  factors  and  our  key 
explanatory variables reflect design choices of the firm (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).  That 
is, the firm chooses to specify incentive  contracts with, for example, maximum available 
bonus of two months’ salary. The firm chooses to include a minority of employees under the 
contract, or to have the contract cover all.  In short, we acknowledge that the firm makes any 
number of design choices with regard to organizational structures and incentive systems.  We 
examine in this paper the effect of all these choices on effort (and on selection).  Since these 
effects must follow after whatever firm choices are made, we do not expect our model to 
suffer from simultaneity issues (and we can use a fully recursive system).   
Figure 1 depicts our conceptual model. 
4. Results      
  Table 1 provides a Pearson correlation matrix across variables.  We find, as expected, 
strong, positive correlations (p<1%) between the effort effect of incentive contracts and its 
associated  variables,  incentive  power  and  performance  measure  properties.    Most  control 
variables are significant and associated in the expected direction with the effort effect of 
incentive  contracts.    In  particular,  the  selection  effect  of  incentive  contracts  is  strongly 
associated with their effort effect, suggesting the importance of controlling for its impact 
when investigating the effort consequences of incentives.  However, we do not find that firm 
size or experience with the incentive plan are correlated with the effort effect.   
  Results are shown in Table 2.  The first hypothesis relates to the issue how incentive 
power affects the effort effect of incentive contracts.  We find no support for the idea that 
higher incentive power is associated with better effort (once the selection effect is controlled   17
for).    The  coefficient  value  on  incentive  power  in  the  link  to  the  effort  effect  is  –0.081 
(t=0.95).  Hypothesis two predicted that less noisy or less distorted performance measures 
would  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  effort  effect  of  incentive  contracts.    Our  evidence 
strongly supports this hypothesis. The coefficient value on performance measure properties in 
the link to the effort  effect  is  0.207  (t=2.42).    Finally, the  third hypothesis related  to  an 
interaction effect between incentive power and performance measures properties.  Theory 
stated  that  the  association  of  each  of  these  variables  with  the  effort  effect  of  incentive 
contracts depends on the level of the other variable.  We find no support for this hypothesis.  
The coefficient value on the interaction term in the link to effort effect is 0.009 (t=0.10).   
  We find a strong relation between the effort effect of incentive contracts and their 
selection effect.  Apparently, the better the proposed incentive contract succeeds in selecting 
good quality employees, the higher is the effort effect of the contract.  The coefficient value 
on the selection effect in the link with the effort effect is 0.404 (t=4.24).  In turn, we find that 
the selection effect of incentive contracts is improved if incentive power is higher (coefficient 
value = 0.207, t=2.56), and if the performance measures in the contract are less noisy or 
distorted (coefficient = 0.175, t=1.99). 
  The results also suggest that the effort effect of incentive contracts depends on the 
amount of support the incentive plan has garnered among employees.  The coefficient value 
of this variable in the causal link with the effort effect is 0.192 (t=2.06).  The other control 
variables  are  not  significantly  associated  with  the  effort  effect  of  incentive  contracts.  
However, we find that employee support and the plan’s coverage of employees are positively 
and significantly associated with the selection effect of incentive contracts. 
  Our  model  explains  about  39%  of  the  variance  in  the  effort  effect  of  incentive 
contracts (and about 40% of the variance in the selection effect of those contracts).   
5. Discussion 
  We find only partial support for our hypotheses.  Nevertheless, jointly our findings 
present  a  plausible  picture  of  how  incentive  contract  design  and  associated  performance   18
measure choices influence the effects of these incentive contracts.  In this section, we tie 
together our findings so far and discuss their implications for theory.   
  It would seem that much of the perceived effects of incentive contracts are realized 
through  the  recruiting  of  better  employees.    Consistent  with  traditional  agency  theory, 
contracts that offer steeper pay-performance relations (i.e., higher incentive power) attract 
commensurately better employees.  These employees choose among incentive contracts based 
on their perception of their skill (Chow, 1983).  If an individual believes he is well-skilled, he 
is  more  likely  to  enter  into  an  employment  contract  that  offers  high-powered  incentives.  
Indeed, his expected payoff under such contract will be higher than under a contract that 
offers a flat wage.  In contrast, individuals with low ability will not choose for a contract with 
high-powered incentives since they will be worse off under such scheme.  In equilibrium, the 
perceptions individuals have about their abilities should not be wrong.  Not only will an 
employee’s perception of his abilities be important when choosing among incentive contracts, 
also the attributes of the contract matter.  In particular, as Waller and Chow (1985) claim, 
workers  may  base  their  contract  selection  on  the  perception  that  performance  will  be 
measured  unidimensionally  and  accurately.    Our  results  support  this  contention;  we  find 
strong evidence that performance measure properties matter when evaluating the selection 
effect of incentive contracts.    
  Once the selection effect of recruiting better employees is accounted for, incentive 
power does not seem to affect the effort of employees in the firm.  However, the way in 
which  the  performance  of  employees  is  measured  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  effort 
provided under an incentive contract.  Noisy or distorted measures reduce the efficacy of 
having an incentive plan as suggested by our theory.  This relation between performance 
measure properties and the effort effect of incentive contracts does not depend on the power 
of incentives provided under the contract.   
  In sum, we find that the properties of performance measures affect the efficacy of 
incentive  contracts (in terms of effort delivered) twofold: directly and indirectly via their   19
influence on the selection of better employees.  Incentive power, on the other hand, only 
impacts on the selection of employees and does not directly lead to more effort. 
6. Conclusions 
  In this study we examine how incentive power and performance measure properties 
impact on the efficacy of incentive contracts in motivating employees to provide effort.  Our 
theory predicts that high powered incentives will elicit more effort from employees.  Theory 
also predicts that  less  noisy  or distorted  performance  measures  will  increase effort under 
incentive  contracts.    Finally,  the  effect  of  performance  measure  properties  on  effort  is 
conditional on the level of incentive power provided.  Our evidence partially supports these 
predictions.    We  find  that  less  noisy  or  distorted  performance  measures  have  a  positive 
relation with the effort effect of incentive contracts.  This relation does, however, not depend 
on the level of incentive power provided.  Neither do we find that incentive power affects 
delivered  effort directly.  Instead, our findings show that much of the effect of incentive 
contracts  arises  through  their  ability  to  select  better  employees.    The  selection  of  better 
employees  is  enhanced  if  the  incentive  contract  offered  to  recruitees  has  a  steep  pay-
performance  relation,  and  more  importantly,  if  the  contracts  has  defined  performance 
measures that have little noise or distortion.  Our study emphasizes the importance of defining 
accurate performance measures in incentive contracts.  Not only will good measures increase 
the  efficacy  of  incentive  contracts  in  motivating  effort,  but  also  will  they  enhance  the 
selection of employees.   
  There are several limitations to our study.  First, the psychometric properties of some 
of our measures are difficult to assess.  For example, the survey we used employed four point 
Likert scales, i.e., scales without natural midpoint.   Some of the questions asked in the survey 
were ‘double barreled’ and some constructs were measured with just one indicator.  To some 
extent these are the inherent problems of using a secondary dataset.  It should be noted that 
the  PLS  estimation  procedure  admits  an  assessment  of  the  validity  and  reliability  of  our 
constructs.  Overall, the statistics suggest that the constructs in this study are reliable, have 
modest amounts of measurement error and pass the tests for discriminant validity.  Moreover,   20
PLS explicitly models and isolates sources of measurement error and allows relations to be 
adjusted for these errors (Barclay et al., 1995).  Notwithstanding these, we acknowledge that 
the  results  should  be  interpreted  with  the  data  limitations  in  mind.    Second,  the  survey 
measured  the  perceptions  of  the  respondents  about  organizational  practices  and  incentive 
contract effects.  To some extent it might be preferable if we could validate these perceptions 
with ‘hard’ data. We cannot since the dataset we used does not allow us to establish the 
identity  of  the  firms  in  the  sample.    Moreover,  concerns  about  measurement  error  in 
perceptual  constructs  are  at  least  somewhat  mitigated  by  the  aforementioned  estimation 
procedures.    Our  results  are  consistent  with  theoretical  predictions  with  regard  to  both 
performance  measure  properties  and  incentive  power,  it  would  seem  unlikely  that  these 
results are completely driven by measurement error.  
  We  leave  for  future  research  to  provide  theory  and  empirical  evidence  on  the 
properties  of  performance  measures  examined  here  and  on  other  dimensions  that  seem 
relevant.    We  could  not  disentangle  the  separate  influence  of  distortion  or  noise  in 
performance measures on incentive contracting, nor did we explicitly address the issue of 
using multiple measures (with each its own characteristics).  It is likely that more detailed 
examination of these properties leads to additional insights.     21
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Figure 1: Conceptual model    27
Table 1 – Panel A 
 
Descriptive  statistics  on  the  sample.    Based  on  151  observations.    Respondents  are  CEOs  of  Dutch  firms.  Data  from  KPMG  People  Solutions  2001 
Compensation practices survey. 
 
  Measure\category  <100  100-250  250-500  500-750  750-1000  >1000 
Size  Number of employees  8.8%  12.2%  24.5%  15.0%  10.2%  29.3% 
           
    about 1 year  1-2 years  2-3 years  > 3 years 
Experience with 
incentive contracts 
In years  3.4%  5.4%  14.8%  76.4% 
           
 














Industry    32.5%  12.6%  3.3%  0.7%  31.7%  19.2% 
           
    at most 1 
monthly 
salary (8%) 








more than 3 
monthly salaries 
Incentive power  Ratio of variable 
to fixed pay 
34.9%  30.1%  21.9%  13.1% 
           




< 5%  5-25%  25-50%  >50% 
    16.0%  29.2%  6.3%  48.5% 
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Table 1 – Panel B 
 
Pearson correlations between latent variables. Based on 151 observations. Diagonal entries are the square root of the average variance extracted. For adequate 
discriminant validity, diagonal entries should be greater than the corresponding off diagonal entries. Composite reliability is a measure of internal consistency 
developed by Fornell and Larcker (1981) and is similar to Cronbach’s alpha. Coefficient estimates above 0.16 are significant at the 5%-level. 
 
 
  Composite 
Reliability 
Index 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1. Effort effect  0.848  0.727                   
2. Selection effect  0.833  0.553  0.790                 
3. Incentive power  -  0.175  0.349  -               
4. Performance measure properties  0.814  0.437  0.406  0.228  0.771             
5. Size  -  -0.037  -0.016  -0.086  -0.173  -           
6. Plan coverage  -  0.132  0.298  -0.030  0.075  -0.137  -         
7. Support of top management  0.885  0.392  0.419  0.290  0.544  -0.186  0.093  0.891       
8. Support of employees  0.867  0.449  0.466  0.252  0.383  -0.058  0.195  0.610  0.827     
9. Experience with plan  -  0.070  0.069  -0.040  0.035  0.217  -0.022  -0.104  0.013  -   
10. Industry dummy  -  0.182  0.281  0.338  0.115  -0.098  0.390  0.262  0.281  -0.043  - 
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Table 2 
 
Results of Partial Least Squares analysis. Based on 151 observations. T-statistics in parentheses are based on bootstrapping (1000 samples with replacement). 
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level two-tailed, respectively. NP = no prediction. 
 
Path from:  Predicted Sign  Path to:   
    Effort effect of incentive contracts  Selection effect of incentive contracts 
    Multiple R2 = 0.3948  Multiple R2 = 0.4014 
Endogenous variable:       
1. Selection effect 
of incentive contracts 
+, not included  0.404 
(4.24)*** 
 
Test variables:       












Control variables:       
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Appendix 1. 
Construct  Items  Mean  Std. 
Effort effect of incentive 
contracts 
     
  The entrepreneurial spirit of employees has clearly improved.  2.57  0.60 
  The performance of a substantial group of employees has improved.  2.41  0.59 
  Our organization know clearly knows in which direction to steer the effort of employees.  2.61  0.67 
  More than in the past, guiding employees towards desired behavior has been successful.   2.57  0.63 
  Variable pay positively contributed to our firm’s culture. Attaining better results and providing more effort is 
now perceived as important. 
2.77  0.59 
Selection effect of incentive 
contracts 
     
  We are a more attractive employer on the market.  2.49  0.62 
  We recruited personnel whose attitude better fitted the organization.  2.54  0.66 
  Our annual wage expense is better linked to the performance of the organization.  2.48  0.76 
Performance measure 
properties 
     
  It is difficult to measure the performance of employees. [Note: noise]  2.68  0.73 
  The probability of arbitrary performance evaluation is high. [Note: noise]  2.55  0.70 
  The relation between organizational outcome and employee effort is difficult to establish. [Note: distortion]  2.73  0.76 
 Support of top management       
  Management is troubled by the implementation of the variable pay plan or does not support it sufficiently.  2.70  0.78 
  Management finds it difficult to distinguish between employees when evaluating performance.  2.28  0.77 
Support of employees       
  Most of the employees do not support the incentive plan.  2.92  0.68 
  The incentive plan is much debated under employees and does not help to improve performance.  2.95  0.62 
  The incentive plan does not fit in the organization’s culture.  3.05  0.63 
 